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CONSTITUTIONAL INVIOLABILITY OF POSSIBILITIES OF
REVERTER AND RIGHTS OF ENTRY IN FLORIDA
JOHN G. STEPHENSON, II1*
The recent sessibn of the Florida Legislature has turned its attention
to the problem of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition
broken.' Because those interests are held in this country to be outside the
operation of the rule against perpetuities,2 they have become the means of
imposing restrictions on the use of land which outlive their usefulness, im-
pairing both the alienability and the development of laud.? They cannot
be terminated judicially, and while they can be released, it is often difficult
to locate the owner and still more difficult to induce him to part with his
interest for a reasonable price.4 Differentiating between the retention of a
reversionary interest when property is dedicated to charitable and public
institutions5 and the employment of revertcr and forfeiture clauses to im-
pose use restrictions in private conveyances, the Legislature has sought to
curtail the validity of the latter by a retroactive statute0 which invites grave
doubts of its constitutionality.
*Professor of Law, The University of Miami; A.B. Princeton University, 1931; LL.B.
Harvard University, 1934; member of the Allegheny County, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26927, effective July 1. 1951.
2. Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pae. 159 (1919); First Universalist Society
v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892); Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home,
244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1922). See GRAY, Tim RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES§§ 310, 312 (4th ed. 1942); SrmEs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
§§ 12, 13 (1951). The rules differ in England. The possibility of reverter is regarded
as inconsistent with Quia Emptores (St. Westm. II, 18 Edw. I, c. 1, 1290) abolishing
subinfeudation, Gray, op. cit. § 32. The right of entry for condition broken is subject
to the rule against perpetuities. In re Da Costa, 1 Ch. 337 [1912]; In re Hollis' Hospital,
2 Ch. 540 [1899].
3. The problem has been discussed and remedial legislation recommended. Comment,
43 ILL. L. Rzv. 90 (1948); Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.. 737 (1931);
Cook, Rights of Entry, Possibilities of Reverter and the Rule against Perpetuities, 15
TEMP. L. 0. 509 (1941); Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as
Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HAEV. L. REV. 248 (1940). One state court
has refused to grant possession where the purpose of the restriction was no longer attain-
able, and one has said it would do so in a proper case. Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App.
2d 291, 10 P.2d 496 (1934); see Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).
The problem has been dealt with by statute very recently in two states, Massachusetts
by a prospective statute in 1946, and Illinois by a retrospective statute in 1947. MAss.
ANN. LAws c. 184, § 23 (Supp. 1946); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 30, §§ 37b-37h (1947). For
current developments, see 1947 ANNUAL SUEVET ot AMERICAN LAw 871; 1948 ANNUAL
SuRvEY OF AM ERIcAN LAw 703.
4. The preamble of the Florida Statute declares that "holders of such possibilities
of reverter have charged and are charging unconscionable fees for releasing such reverter
provisions."
5. The act does not apply to conveyances to "any Governmental, educational, literary,
scientific, religious, public utility, public transportation, charitable or non-profit corpora-
tion or society." Sec. 5.
6. The various commentators mentioned in note 3, supra, suggest that abolition
must be by prospective legislation. See Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.J.
737 (1931). The legislation in question was not sponsored by the Florida Bar. See
Wigginton, Report of Legislative Committee, 25 FLA. L. 1. 190 (1951), and text of
sponsored bills, ibid., 192.
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While the interests affected are denominated "reverters" and "forfei-
tures," reference is doubtless made to the possibility of reverter and right of
entry for condition broken as those 'terms are defined in the few Florida
cases and in standard texts.' The right of the grantor in either case is now
made unenforceable after twenty-one years. The statute disposes in separate
sections of conveyances which have been in effect more than twenty-one
years,' all other conveyances which became effective before July 1, 1951,9
and conveyances which become effective after that date.'0 The statute also
substitutes for the traditional remedy, which consisted of an action for
possession of the land, a right to enjoin enforcement of the use restrictions
by bill in equity."
It should be noted that, aside from the statute, there are other rules of
law which narrow the field in which possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry can be employed. If the limitation or divesting condition is imposed
as a direct restraint on the power of alienation, it is void under the rule
against restraints on alienation.' Restrictions on use and occupancy, however,
are not direct restraints on alienation; but use restrictions which enforce dis-
crimination based on race, color or previous condition of servitude, although
not illegal, have been declared no longer judicially enforceable in a recent
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States."s
The constitutionality of the statute, to the extent that it affects interests
created by deed executed before July 1, 1951, will turn on the answer to
two questions: first, whether or not the interest taken is "property" or
"vested"; and second, if it is held to be a species of property, whether or not
there has been an unconstitutional taking. An interest which is classed as a
"Inere expectancy" or sPes successionis may be terminated without raising
constitutional problems. 14 This principle is illustrated in cases upholding
statutes which change the law of descent to the disadvantage of an heir
apparent, abolish the right of survivorship in existing joint tenancies, and
7. See Richardson v. Hollman, 160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948); Sorrels v.
McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106 (1925); Case Comment, 1 U. or FLA. L. REV. 309(1948); CRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIPS §§ 12-13 (4th ed. 1942); SiNtES, -lAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 12-13 (1951). While the two types are
distinguished by the language used in their creation (Sorrels v. McNally, suora), the
distinction is immaterial in Florida. Richardson v. -loliman, supra.
8. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26927, § 2, effective June It, 1951, when the act became a
law without the approval of the Governor.
9. Id. at § 3.
10. Id. at § 4.
11. Id. at § 7. Existing causes of action are not affected by this section.
12. Bonnell v. McLaughlin, 173 Cal. 213, 159 Pac. 590 (1916); Freeman v.
Phillips, 113 Ga. 589, 38 S.E. 943 (1901); Davison v. Hutchinson, 282 Ill. 523, 118
N.E. 721 (1918); and cases cited in SIMES, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS 344, notes 19 and 20 (1951).
13. Enforcement by judicial sanction is state action of the type prohibited in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemcr, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
14. Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So.Zd 419 (1948); Stephenson, Synopsis,
3 MIAMI L. Q. 40 (1948).
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the like.' The quality of a possibility of reverter or right of entry in Florida
is doubtful, for it has been characterized obiter as a mere expectancy 6 and
as a transferable interest in the nature of a reversion.' 7 At common law,
neither type of interest was devisable 8 or alienable,1"' but both could be
released.20 It was asserted that the person entitled to possession, when the
original grantor was dead, was that person who would have been the grantor's
heir if the grantor had died immediately following the accrual of the right
of entry: that lie took by right of representation and not by descent. 2' It has
also been generally held that the owner of a possibility of reverter is not
entitled to protect his interest by an action for waste, 22 or to participate in
the proceeds of a sale under power of eminent domain.23  With such attri-
butes, an interest can be little more than a mere expectancy. The recent
growth of the law, on the other hand, has been in the direction of holding
these interests devisable and assignable,2 4 which gives them a more substan-
tial quality. Florida has recently held a possibility of reverter to be assignable,
the case being widely noted as evidence of the modern trend..25
If it is assumed that the interest is property, it has been taken uncon-
stitutionally unless the action can be justified by some supervening public
necessity. Retroactive statutes may be held unconstitutional on three differ-
ent grounds: as being the performance of a judicial act by the legislature in
violation of the principle of separation of powers; as impairing the obligation
of a contract; or as being a taking without due process of law.28 It may be
argued that absolute destruction is too severe; that it would be more just to
subject the troublesome interests to condemnation under the power of
eminent domain.2 7 Where property is taken or its use restricted, with or
15. Applied to statutes abolishing survivorship in ioint tenancies, Holbrook v. Finney,
4 Mass. 565, 3 Am. Dcc. 243 (1808); Bambaugh v. Bambangh, 11 S. & R. 190 (Pa.
1824); statute converting estates tail into fees simple, De Mill v. Lockwood, 3 Blatch.
C.C. 56 (1853); statute abolishing curtesy, McNeer v. McNeer, 142 It1. 388, 32 N.E.
681 (1892). See 2 COOLEY, CONSTIrUTIONAI. LIMITATIONS 794 (8th ed. 1927).
16. "'it is not an estate but the mere possibility of having an estate at some future
time." Terrell, 1. in Sorrels v. McNally, supra note 7 at 463, 105 So. at 109.
17. It is characterized as a "'reversionary interest" by Terrell, J., in Richardson v.
Hollman, supra note 7.
18. Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896).
19. Rice v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 12 Allen 141 (Mass. 1866).
20. Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Putnam, 249 N.Y. 111, 162 N.E.
601 (1928).
21. Upington v. Corrigan, supra note 18.
22. Dees v. Cheuvrons, 240 111. 486. 88 N.E. 1011 (19091.
23. Lyford v. Laconia, 75 N.H. 220, 72 At. 1085 (1909); First Reformed Dutch
Church v. Crosswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206 N.Y. Supp. 132 (3d Dep't 1924).
24. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 164, 165 (1936); Collette v. Town of Charlotte.
114 Vt. 357, 45 A.2d 203 (1946).
25. Richardson v. 1lollman, supra note 7; Comment, I U. or FLA. L. REV. 309(1948); 1948 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 703; SIu'ES, IANDBOOK ON FUTURE
INTERESTS 107, n. 31 (1951).
26. Illustrated in Florida cases: (statute outlawing possession of liquor acquired
prior to passage of prohibition law), In re 7 Barrels of Wine, 7 Fla. I, 83 So. 627 (1920);(statute outlawing note given for purchase price of a slave), McNealy v. Gregory, 13
Fla. 417 (1869-71).
27. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, seeking to abolish existing irredeemable
ground rents, which constituted a problem in conveyancing not unlike the one under
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without compensation, constitutionality depends upon a demonstration that
the property, or its use, constitutes a course of danger to the public.28 While
the Legislature has found, as stated in the preamble, that these interests
constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation, it may be argued with
authority29 that the nuisance, if any, is private, disturbing only those who
deraign title under restricted deeds either knowingly or relying on the advice
of persons not learned in the law. A possible denial of equal protection,
suggested by the exemption of conveyances to public and charitable institu-
tions, can be justified by obvious differences and by the public interests ad-
vanced by such institutions30
To the extent that the statute is prospective in its operation, none of
the constitutional objections advanced above can apply, but there are other
problems. An act unconstitutional in part may be unconstitutional as a
whole if the Supreme Court finds that the unconstitutional parts are not
severable.3' Since this will depend upon the ascertainment of legislative
intent, in which the appellate court may be influenced by many unpredict-
able factors, it is impossible to forecast the result. It may not be going too
far afield to suggest a problem of interpretation. Will a reverter clause in-
serted in a deed delivered after July 1, 1951, which is not expressly limited
to expire in twenty-one years, be void as to the excess or wholly void? The
language of the statute is plain; but it must be realized that this is in effect
a statutory rule against perpetuities a2 and the influence of decisions under
the common law rule and the statutory rules of other states may lead to a
different construction. 3 Until that point has been settled, the conveyancer
consideration, provided for their purchase at a fair price to be determined in a judicial
proceeding. The state supreme court (Sharswood, f.) held the statute unconstitutional
because the remedy was more in the interest of the private owner than of the public.
Paileret's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479 (1871).
28. In re 7 Barrels of Wine, suora note 26.
29. Pauleret's Appeal, supra note 27; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922) (statute forbidding mining so as to cause subsidence of surface structures
used for human habitation). hlere may be a preponderant public concern in the
preservation of the interest of one over the other when there is a conflict of private
interests: Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (statute requiring the destruction
of red cedar trees harboring a pest destroying apple orchards); see Dalton Phosphate Co.
v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 85 So. 282 (1914) (between cattlemen and phosphate miners).
30. Equal protection is not denied where there is a reasonable basis for classification.
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 (1940); Peninsular Industrial Ins. Co. v. State 61 Fla.
376, 55 So. 398 (1911).
31. It is often stated that there is a presumption that the legislature intends an act
to be effective in its entirety. See Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601(1895). The Florida cases apparently recognize no such presumption, making the ques-
tion one of severability. State v. Hilburn, 70 Fla. 55, 69 So. 784 (1915); State ex Tel.
Haley v. Starkey, 18 Fla. 255 (1881); Bucky v. Willard, 16 Fla. 330 (1878).
32. The rule against perpetuities, when applied to the duration of trusts restraining
alienation, such as trusts to accumulate, spendthrift trusts, indestructible (Claflin) trusts,
honorary trusts, etc., which may last longer than the limited period, strikes down the
whole trust, not merely the excess. Alexander v. House, 133 Conn. 725, 54 A.2d 510(1947); Van Eps v. Arbuckle, 332 I11. 551, 164 N.E. 1 (1928); RESTATEMENT, PROP-
ERTY, § 381 (1944); SIMES, HANDBooK ON FUTURE INTERESTS C. 24 (1951).
33. When a statute of another state is adopted, the prior decisions of that state
construing the statute become rules of construction in the adopting state; for example, a
statute specifically relating only to trusts of real property was construed as relating also
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will do well to insert a positive limitation whenever there is occason to place
a restriction on the use of property.
Important changes are made in the remedies of persons holding possi-
bilities of reverter and rights of entry. Those whose rights have ripened into
a cause of action must assert them on or before July 1, 1952, or be forever
barred. 4 The period is not unreasonably short and appears to present no
problem of constitutionality 5 As to causes of action accruing after July 1,
1951, a new remedy is provided. Where formerly the owner of the possibility
of reverter or right of entry was entitled to recover possession in an action of
ejectment, he is now entitled exclusively to a bill in equity to enjoin use of
the property in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of the divesting re-
straint.386 When this is applied to deeds executed before July 1, 1951, con-
stitutionality depends upon the adequacy of the remedy substituted. 37
Since it may be argued that the grantor is more interested in restricting the
use of the land than in recapturing it, the substituted remedy appears satis-
factory. The change in remedy does not apply to the enforcement of possi-
bilities of reverter and rights of entry in deeds to public and charitable
institutions.38
In conclusion, it cannot be said with assurance that the act is unconsti-
tutional either in whole or in part; but there are grave doubts which must
await judicial determination. A good argument can be made to show that
the curtailed interests are mere expectancies, and that there is a definite
public interest in removing them as a bar to the marketability of land; but
existing authority is on the other side. If the act should be held unconstitu-
tional because it serves a private rather than a public purpose, remedial
legislation requiring these interests to be sold for a fair price, judicially
determinable, would also be unconstitutional. While awaiting decision, no
to trusts of personal property. Canfield v. Security-First National Bank, 13 Cal. 2d
1, 87 P.2d 830 (1939). The same rule is adopted when a statute is regarded as adopt-
ing a rule of the common law; for example, a statute legalizing charitable trusts in a
state where they were not formerly legal, was held to adopt the common law definition
of charity, although the statutory definition was narrower. Chicago Bank of Commerce
v. McPherson, 67 F.2d 393 (1932). Since Gray argued that the correct common law
rule was to apply the rule against perpetuities to rights of entry, there is a basis for argu-
ment that the statute adopts the correct common law view. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES §§ 299-310 (4th ed. 1942). The Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits
suits against states by citizens of other states, was held to prohibit suits by citizens of the
same state in an appeal to history. tans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26927 § 6.
35. A statute that shortens a period of limitations is valid if it allows a reasonable
period after its enactment for the assertion of existing claims. Matteson v. Dep't of
Labor & Industries, 293 U.S. 151 (1934).
36. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26927 § 7.
37. A substantial change in the remedies by which property rights, already acquired,
are asserted, would be a taking without due process, unless, of course, under circumstances
of public necessity which would otherwise justify a direct taking. Cf. Sturges v. Crownin-
shield, 4 Wheat, 122 (U.S. 1819) with lloneyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939).
38. Sec. 5 exempts such conveyances from the operation of the entire act.
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title can be considered marketable if it is subject to divesting restrictions;
but no conveyancer will create possiblities of reverter or conditions sub-
sequent without providing expressly that they will not be effective aftex
twenty-one years.
